Press Releases
This reports the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB)’s investigation into a fire in the engine room of the dredger Arco Avon while the vessel was loading a sand cargo approximately twelve miles off Great Yarmouth, UK. The fire claimed the life of the vessel’s third engineer, who was attempting to repair a failed fuel pipe when fuel, under pressure in the pipe, ignited.
Safety Issues The third engineer’s decision to act autonomously without informing either the Officer of the Watch was contrary to documented standing orders but was commensurate with the onboard culture of regular lone working The fact that sparks generated by using fixed and portable angle grinders produce a hot work hazard is not currently acknowledged in marine industry guidance The contents of International Maritime Organization (IMO) circular MSC. 1/Circ.1321, which recommends a 6 monthly inspection of fuel system pipework to be included in a vessel’s SMS, had not been formally promulgated to the UK shipping industry Merchant Shipping Notices relating to personal protective equipment in engine rooms are inadequate, suggesting that cotton garments could provide fire protection The Ship Captain’s medical guide gave confusing and inconsistent advice on the treatment of serious burnsd. he European Commission has announced scientific criteria to determine what is an endocrine disruptor under the pesticides and biocides regulations. ECHA (European Chemical Agency) is assessing how the new criteria will impact its work under the Biocidal Products Regulation.
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) has published a report on the grounding of the cruise ship Hamburg in the Sound of Mull in May 2015.
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hamburg-report-published.
The conclusions made are that: i) Hamburg grounded on the charted New Rocks shoal because the bridge team did not recognise that their vessel was approaching the shoal, which is marked by a buoy, from an unsafe direction. ii) Insufficient attention was being paid to the conduct of navigation on Hamburg. iii) Hamburg’s bridge team failed to operate in a structured manner either before or after the grounding. Specifically: • The individuals on the bridge were working in isolation, with no recognition of their individual responsibilities, and were, therefore, unable to provide the master with the assistance he required to maintain his situational awareness. • No actions or decisions taken at any stage on Hamburg’s bridge, before or following the grounding, were questioned by any member of the bridge team. • As a result of poor communication, the bridge team were unable to respond effectively to the challenges resulting from the developing traffic situation in their approach to the New Rocks shoal. iv) Once Hamburg entered the Sound of Mull there were insufficient personnel on the bridge, even had their tasks been clearly specified, for the master to maintain situational awareness. v) The master did not demand a high standard of navigational practices from his officers.