The ECHA reminds companies that, by 1st September, they should apply for the approval of active substances in biocidal products which fall within the scope of the revised Biocidal Products Regulation.
This deadline concerns two groups:
Active substances in food contact materials for surface action. In situ generated active substances with precursors that were not in the scope of the directive because they were not placed on the market, or because no claim was made that these precursors could be used for a biocidal purpose.The amended REACH annexes concerning skin and eye irritation and acute dermal toxicity have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union and will enter into force on 20 June. The REACH requirements for skin corrosion/irritation, serious eye damage/eye irritation, acute dermal toxicity and skin sensitisation are changing, making non-animal testing the default requirement. ECHA (European Chemical Agency) reminds registrants of their obligations to consider and, where possible, use alternative methods.
The ECHA (the European Chemical Agency) has proposed that two substances be identified as substances of very high concern (SVHC). These are the phthalate DCHP, due to its toxicity for reproduction and endocrine disruptive effects to humans, and 3-benzylidene camphor due to its endocrine disruptive effects to the environment.
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) has published a report on the grounding of the cruise ship Hamburg in the Sound of Mull in May 2015.
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hamburg-report-published.
The conclusions made are that: i) Hamburg grounded on the charted New Rocks shoal because the bridge team did not recognise that their vessel was approaching the shoal, which is marked by a buoy, from an unsafe direction. ii) Insufficient attention was being paid to the conduct of navigation on Hamburg. iii) Hamburg’s bridge team failed to operate in a structured manner either before or after the grounding. Specifically: • The individuals on the bridge were working in isolation, with no recognition of their individual responsibilities, and were, therefore, unable to provide the master with the assistance he required to maintain his situational awareness. • No actions or decisions taken at any stage on Hamburg’s bridge, before or following the grounding, were questioned by any member of the bridge team. • As a result of poor communication, the bridge team were unable to respond effectively to the challenges resulting from the developing traffic situation in their approach to the New Rocks shoal. iv) Once Hamburg entered the Sound of Mull there were insufficient personnel on the bridge, even had their tasks been clearly specified, for the master to maintain situational awareness. v) The master did not demand a high standard of navigational practices from his officers.